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Introduction: Even when women and people of color achieve positions of political power, that does
not guarantee they will be able to wield the same amount of influence as similarly-situated white

men. Institutional norms may combine with social constructions of difference to create a system in

which power is distributed disproportionately. Such a pattern is evident in the U.S. Courts of Appeals.
Benign procedural practices and laudable deliberative processes combine with divergent viewpoints

generated by fundamentally different social experiences to create a system in which power is exercised
unequally.
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Even when women and people of color achieve positions of political power, that does not guarantee they
will be able to wield the same amount of influence as similarly-situated white men. Institutional norms
may combine with social constructions of difference to create a system in which power is distributed

disproportionately. Such a pattern is evident in the U.S. Courts of Appeals. Benign procedural practices
and laudable deliberative processes combine with divergent viewpoints generated by fundamentally
different social experiences to create a system in which power is exercised unequally.

Judges on the U.S. Courts of Appeals split their time between resolving important, policy-shaping cases
and routine matters that do not have an impact on circuit law. In order to keep up with an increasing

number of overall appeals, yet still provide quality legal analysis, circuit courts developed the practice of
designating some opinions as “unpublished.” Such opinions are not binding legal precedent. As a result,
they do not play a role in shaping policy. Each case is resolved by a panel of three judges who also
decide whether the opinion should be binding precedent (i.e., “published”) or not.

A wide variety of research shows that diversity in decision-making groups produces both a wider range
of ideas and more deliberation. This dynamic can lead to higher quality policy outputs. But the same
patterns may also inadvertently depress the ability of diverse groups of judges to shape legal policy,
resulting in law disproportionately crafted by homogeneous groups of judges. More diverse

decisionmaking groups tend to produce a wider range of perspectives. This can generate divergent

viewpoints about a case and, thus, a need to compromise. One way to compromise is to leave an opinion
unpublished so that the judge unhappy with the result can be assured it will at least not shape the law of
the circuit. Consequently, cases where there is more likely to be disagreement among judges may also
be more likely to result in unpublished opinions. This, in turn, suggests that judicial diversity may be
associated with lower levels of opinion publication and, thus, policy influence.

I use a comprehensive original dataset of dispositive circuit opinions from 2002 to 2012 to explore the
correlation between publication and panel diversity. Figure 1 illustrates that there is consistent

evidence of demographic diversity depressing publication rates. Overall, cases with homogeneous

panels published 32% of their opinions while panels with race and gender diversity published only

21%. Regression analysis accounting for a number of other case factors (including ideological diversity)
confirms the important role of demographic diversity, but the publication gap is approximately 4-

5%. The circuit courts issued an average of nearly twenty thousand opinions per year. Based on the

frequency of diverse and homogenous panels from 2002 to 2012, the estimated diversity gap of 4-5%

represents nearly 900 opinions annually issued by diverse panels that did not make law which would

have if the panel in question was homogenous. In short, federal law is shaped by homogeneous groups

of judges to a greater degree than diverse groups of judges. Nearly all homogenous panels in the dataset
(98%) were composed of white men. Not all federal circuit judges share the same policy-making

power. Even those women and people of color who make it to such a powerful position wield less
influence than their white and male peers.

Figure 1: Distribution of published and unpublished opinions by demographic makeup of the panel for U.S. Courts
of Appeals cases resolved from 2002 to 2012

